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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN, 
Appellant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20010060-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
• * * 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
In paragraph 7 of its opinion, did the Court impose a greater burden on the proponent 
of a peremptory strike in explaining the reasons for the strike than that required by the United 
States Supreme Court? 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
The State asks the Court to amend its opinion to clarify the proper burden carried by 
the State once a defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in 
the State's exercise of a peremptory strike. 
COURT'S OPINION 
A copy of the Court's opinion, State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT 363, — Utah Adv. Rep. —, 
is reproduced in Addendum A. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO REFLECT UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
In paragraph 7 of the opinion, the Court outlined the three-step process for 
determining whether a peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Referring to the second step, the 
Court held: 
Under our jurisprudence, once the prima facie case has been established, the 
proponent of a peremptory strike must provide the trial court with a neutral 
explanation. And while the United States Supreme Court has determined that 
this explanation need be neither genuinely persuasive nor even entirely 
plausible, in Utah the reasons given for striking a potential juror must be, at 
the very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific, related to the 
case being tried, and legitimate. 
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, atf 7 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The second 
sentence suggests that Utah courts impose additional requirements upon the proponent of a 
strike, and thus a greater burden, than does the United States Supreme Court. This, our state 
courts cannot do. As recently observed by the Utah Supreme Court, "the United States 
Supreme Court has been vested with final authority in interpreting the federal Constitution 
since the inception of our republic/' State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^  46,37 P.3d 1073 (citing 
U.S Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1, andMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803)). 
The four requirements referred to by the Court in paragraph 7 in fact originate from 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712 
(1986). In that case, the high court held that once the defendant makes a prima facie 
2 
showing, the burden shifts to the State to offer "a neutral explanation related to the particular 
case to be tried. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. In further explaining that burden, the 
Court noted that "the prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of 
his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Id. at 98 n.20,106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.20 
(citations omitted). 
Based on the foregoing language from Batson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the prosecutor "must at least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for 
believing those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties 
as a juror." Purkett v. Elem, 25 F.3d 679,683 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). The Eighth 
Circuit thus equated "legitimate with "plausible." On certiorari review, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected that notion, holding as follows: 
[These requirements were] meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could 
satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a 
discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith. What it means 
by a "legitimate reason" is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that 
does not deny equal protection. 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,769,115 S.Ct. 1769,1771 (1995). The high court thus held 
that "[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or 
even plausible." Id. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. The Court held that "'[u]nless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race neutral.999 Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 
1859, 1866 (1991) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). 
3 
The Court's language in paragraph 7, therefore, creates two potential misconcepti 
First, the Court indicates that "the United States Supreme Court has determined that [the 
prosecutor's] explanation need be neither genuinely persuasive nor even entirely plausible." 
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, at f 7 (emphasis added). Use of the word "entirely" suggests 
that the explanation be slightly or somewhat plausible. The Supreme Court did not impose 
such a restriction, but held that even "silly or superstitious" explanations, so long as they 
were not inherently discriminatory, would meet the State's burden in step two (though likely 
not in step three). Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. 
Second, by indicating that Utah requires that "the reasons given for striking a potential 
juror must be, at the very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific, related to the 
case being tried, and legitimate," the Court implies that a "legitimate" reason is something 
more than a non-discriminatory reason. However, as the United States Supreme Court in 
Purkett explained, "a 'legitimate reason* is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that 
does not deny equal protection," i.e., that is not inherently discriminatory. 514 U.S. at 769, 
115 S.Ct. at 1771. The language used by the Court also suggests that Utah imposes a greater 
burden on the prosecutor in meeting the second step. However, as noted above, the Court 
is not at liberty to impose a greater burden with regard to the federal Equal Protection Clause. 
See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 46. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully petitions this Court to amend 
paragraph 7 of its opinion in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Purkett 
4 
GOOD FAITH CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for petitioner certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for 
the purpose of delay. 
Respectfully submitted this < ? f c W of November, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
?REY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that on the^faf day of November, 2002,1 served two copies of the 
attached Petition for Rehearing upon the appellant/respondent, Jeffery Ray Chatwin, by 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, ) OPINION 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jeffery Ray Chatwin, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
,, /'LED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 0 7 2002 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20010060-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 7, 2002) 
2002 UT App 363, 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Heather Johnson and John D. 0!Connell Jr., Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thorne. 
THORNE, Judge: 
Hi Defendant Jeffery Ray Chatwin appeals from his conviction of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, following a jury 
trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
12 In June of 2000, after being charged with aggravated assault 
following a reported domestic disturbance, Chatwin pleaded not 
guilty. The trial court then set a November 21, 2000 trial date. 
On the morning of November 21, a jury venire was assembled and 
the trial court conducted voir dire. Following voir dire, the 
court directed the parties to select the jury. 
H3 After the normal process of jury selection was completed, 
the trial court excused the selected panel to address a concern 
raised by Chatwinfs counsel. During the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, Chatwin's counsel observed that the Prosecutor had 
struck the sole minority who had been included in the venire. 
Chatwin's counsel raised this as a concern to the trial court, 
and, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 
(1986), the trial court directed the prosecutor to explain his 
reasons for excusing the minority venire person. 
f4 The prosecutor, after briefly challenging whether Chatwin 
had established a prima facie case of discrimination, explained 
that he had struck the potential juror not on the basis of race, 
but because he felt 
that this jury would be better able to 
deliberate the evidence that I anticipate[d] 
presenting to it if [the jury was] balanced 
between men and women. I therefore made 
efforts to take men off of the jury. That 
may not make a great deal of sense, but that 
was the game plan. [The venire person] was a 
man, I took him because he was a man . . . . 
Hearing this, Chatwin's counsel then informed the trial court 
Batson had been extended to prohibit the use of gender, as well 
as race, as a reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. See 
J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). The 
trial court, however, discounted counsel's statement, explaining: 
Well, I am not prepared to state that the 
challenge was inappropriate. It appears to 
me that there's been a justification for 
exercising the challenge . . . . And 
moreover I'm not persuaded that in a case of 
this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse 
type of case, that selecting jurors, be they 
male or female which the Prosecutor or 
Defense for that matter decides might be more 
inclined to adhere to the Prosecution's 
theory of the case or the Defense's theory, 
for instance, that that was an inappropriate 
way or manner or justification for a 
challenge. 
Thus, the trial court denied Chatwin's challenge to the 
prosecutor's strike and seated the jury as selected. Chatwin was 
then tried and convicted of aggravated assault, and subsequently 
sentenced to spend not more than five years in the Utah State 
Prison. The trial court, however, suspended this sentence and 
placed Chatwin on probation for one year. Chatwin now appeals. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
15 Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated reason for 
striking the potential juror was not neutral and constituted 
illegal discrimination. Thus, he continues, the trial court 
erred in countenancing the prosecutor's behavior. Absent a 
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial court's 
determination concerning the discriminatory intent embodied in a 
party's explanation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 
Se& State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,15, 41 P.3d 1153. 
ANALYSIS 
f6 "[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
governs the exercise of peremptory challenges," J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
at 128, 114 S. Ct. at 1421, and "[i]ntentional discrimination on 
the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to 
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad 
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." Id. 
at 130-31, 114 S. Ct. at 1422; aggprfl State v. Sheppard. 1999 UT 
App 305,128, 989 P.2d 503; see also State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 
8,^14-22, 994 P.2d 177. Accordingly, if a party's reasons for 
the exercise of a peremptory challenge are discriminatory on 
their face, the trial court has a duty to disallow that challenge 
and failure to do so constitutes clear error that will result in 
our reversing an otherwise error-free conviction, and remanding 
the case for a new trial. See J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145-46, 114 S. 
Ct. at 1430; Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at 1111-13. 
17 To limit the possibility of discrimination creeping into our 
jury selection process, we have developed a body of law that 
establishes a well-defined path that must be followed once the 
opponent to a peremptory strike establishes a prima facie case of 
unlawful discrimination regarding that strike (or series of 
strikes). See, e.g.. Colwell. 2000 UT 8 at 1l7; Cannon. 2002 UT 
App 18 at 116-13; Sheppard. 1999 UT App 305 at 1128-29. Under 
our jurisprudence, once the prima facie case has been 
established, the proponent of a peremptory strike must provide 
the trial court with a neutral explanation. See Colwell, 2000 UT 
8 at 1117, 19; Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at 116-13; Sheppard. 1999 
UT App 305 at 128. And while the United States Supreme Court has 
determined that this explanation need be neither genuinely 
persuasive nor even entirely plausible, see Purkett v. Elem. 514 
U.S. 765, 769, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam), in Utah 
the reasons given for striking a potential juror must be, at the 
very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific, 
related to the case being tried, and legitimate. See Cannon, 
2002 UT App 18 at 19. Finally, should the strike's proponent 
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tender a neutral explanation, the trial court must then look 
beyond the explanation, if possible, to determine whether the 
strike was purposefully discriminatory. See id. at 1l3 
18 Here, in response to the argument mounted by Chatwin on 
appeal, the State asserts that at trial Chatwin failed to carry 
his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Thus, the State continues, the trial court erred in requiring the 
Prosecutor to explain his reason for striking the potential 
juror. However, we conclude that because Chatwin raised this 
issue in the context of Batson and under the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause, this issue is controlled by the rule 
established in Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 
1859 (1991) . In Hernandez, the State of New York offered an 
argument similar to the argument offered by the State in the 
instant case. See id. at 359, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. There, after 
the defendant had raised an objection to the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude potential Latino jurors from the 
panel, the prosecutor offered his reasons for the challenges 
"without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court." Id.1 
19 On appeal, the Supreme Court was not concerned with the 
effect of the prosecutor's decision to offer an explanation or 
the trial court's acquiescence with the prosecutor's decision. 
See id. Instead, the Court determined that " [o]nce a prosecutor 
has offered [an] explanation for the peremptory challenges and 
the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant 
has made a prima facie showing becomes moot." Id. While we see 
no reason this rule should not apply equally to cases involving 
alleged gender discrimination, in the instant case, Chatwin's 
initial challenge focused on the excused juror's minority status; 
thus, the Hernandez rule is clearly applicable. 
1l0 Therefore, because the prosecutor offered an explanation for 
his peremptory challenge and the trial court ruled on the 
ultimate question, we conclude that any discussion concerning 
Chatwin's attempt to establish a prima facie case is moot. 
Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the Prosecutor's 
explanation and, if necessary, the trial court's conclusions 
concerning the Prosecutor's explanation. 
1. We acknowledge that, unlike the situation presented in 
Hernandez, here the prosecutor attempted to argue that Chatwin 
had failed to establish a prima facie case prior to providing the 
required explanation. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 
356, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1856 (1991). We do not, however, see this 
as material to our analysis. 
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111 Chatwin argues that the explanation proffered by the 
Prosecutor in defense of his peremptory challenge clearly 
violated both the spirit and the letter of the Equal Protection 
Clause as highlighted by J.E.B. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145, 114 
S. Ct. at 1430. In response, the State argues that Chatwin has 
misinterpreted the scope of J.E.B. and that the Prosecutor's 
strike was neither gender-based nor did it violate the principles 
articulated in J.E.B. In making this argument, the State offers 
three alternative explanations. We address each in turn. 
112 At oral argument the State asserted that because this case 
involves gender and not race, the explanation of the Prosecutor 
and the decision of the trial court are subject to a less 
rigorous standard of review. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (»[A]11 
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or 
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court 
under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests."), with Mississippi 
Univ. for Women v. Hoaan. 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 
3336 (1982) (stating that state action involving gender 
classification must serve an important governmental objective and 
be substantially related to the achievement of that objective). 
However, not only was this argument made for the first time at 
oral argument and unsupported by any relevant case law, our 
review of the relevant case law suggests that it is wholly 
inapplicable. S££ Aflar«Wl CQngt^gfrQrg, lx\Q. v. Minet;^ , 534 U.S. 
103, 109, 122 S. Ct. 511, 513-14 (2001) (per curiam) (stating 
"application of our [heightened] scrutiny standard should be 
addressed in the first instance by the lower courts" (quotations 
and citation omitted)). 
113 Rather, we conclude that the plain language of J.E.B. itself 
provides the proper analytical framework for examining any 
possible equal protection violations during jury selection. In 
J.E.B., the Court stated that "[w]hen persons are excluded from 
participation in our democratic processes solely because of 
[either] race or gender, [the] promise of equity dims, and the 
integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized." 511 U.S. at 
146, 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Moreover, the Court categorically 
stated that "[f]ailing to provide jurors the same protection 
against gender discrimination as race discrimination could 
frustrate the purpose of Batson itself." Id. at 145, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1430 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to the State's 
suggestion at oral argument, possible gender discrimination in 
the jury selection process is subject to the same examination as 
possible racial discrimination. See id. at 154-55, 114 U.S. at 
1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the court erred 
in failing to apply intermediate scrutiny). 
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f14 Accordingly, J.E.B. mandates that whether the perceived 
discrimination involves race or gender, the responsible party 
must provide a facially neutral explanation for the strike or the 
peremptory challenge violates equal protection. See id. at 145, 
114 S. Ct. at 1430. Should the record support a finding that the 
prosecutor provided the trial court with a facially neutral 
explanation, regardless of whether the challenger's objection is 
based upon race or gender, we then review the trial court's 
findings for clear error. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at 1|5. 
Therefore, contrary to the State's position at oral argument, we 
examine the record to first determine whether the prosecutor's 
explanation was neutral on its face, and then, if necessary, we 
proceed to examine the trial court's findings and conclusions. 
115 The State next argues that rather than eliminating gender as 
an acceptable reason for a peremptory challenge, J.E.B. merely 
forbids the use of gender stereotypes in peremptory challenges. 
We disagree. 
116 In J.E.B, the respondent, the State of Alabama, filed a 
paternity suit against the petitioner and used its peremptory 
challenges solely for the purpose, of removing male jurors from 
the jury pool, SSS J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 129, 114. S. Ct. at 1422. 
The petitioner appealed on equal protection grounds and the 
Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "gender, like race, is an 
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality." 
Id. at 129, 114 S. Ct. at 1421. 
fl7 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that 
"[b]ecause [gender] stereotypes have wreaked injustice in so many 
other spheres of our country's public life, active discrimination 
by litigants on the basis of gender during the jury selection 
invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its 
obligation to adhere to the law." Id. at 140, 114 S. Ct. at 1427 
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the Court continued, 
gender-related peremptory challenges are extremely suspect "in 
cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases 
involving rape, sexual harassment, or paternity." Id. The 
Court's concern, therefore, focused not simply on stereotypes, 
but on any use of gender in the jury selection process. After 
reviewing J.E.B., we conclude that the Supreme Court's discussion 
of stereotypes merely highlighted the fallacious reasoning that 
often underlies gender discrimination and it was not intended to 
permit so-called "non-stereotypical discrimination" as suggested 
by the State. Accordingly, the State's position concerning the 
central holding of J.E.B. is without merit and we conclude that 
gender is an impermissible reason for a party to strike a 
potential juror. 
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1l8 The State1s final argument is that rather than evidencing an 
intent to discriminate on the basis of gender, the Prosecutor's 
explanation was merely an attempt to balance the composition of 
the jury to reflect the views of both men and women. Moreover, 
the State continues, such a rationale does not violate the 
precepts of J.E.B. In making this argument, the State seizes 
upon certain language contained in J.E.B. for support. See id. 
at 141-42, 114 S. Ct. at 1428. However, our reading of this 
language, and its surrounding sections, suggests that the Court 
was merely explaining its rationale for prohibiting the use of 
gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges, not creating an 
exception. See id. In addition to noting that "gender, like 
race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and 
impartiality," id. at 129, 114 S. Ct. at 1421, the Court stated 
that 
[a]11 persons, when granted the'opportunity 
to serve on a jury, have the right not to be 
excluded summarily because of discriminatory 
and stereotypical presumptions that reflect 
and reinforce patterns of historical 
discrimination. Striking individual jurors 
on the assumption that they hold particular 
views simply because of their gender is 
"practically a brand upon them, affixed by 
the law, an assertion of their inferiority." 
Id. at 141-42, 114 S. Ct. at 1428 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Strawfer vT Wqgt Virginia/ 100 U.S. 303, 306 
(1880)). Finally, the Court concluded that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
discrimination in jury selection on the basis 
<?£ gender, or on the asgumpti<?n that an 
individual will be biased in a particular 
case for no reason other than the fact that 
the person happens to be a woman or happens 
to be a man. As with race, the "core 
guarantee of equal protection, ensuring 
citizens that their State will not 
discriminate . . . , would be meaningless 
were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on 
the basis of such assumptions, which arise 
solely from the jurors' [gender]." 
Id. at 146, 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (alterations in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Batsoiy 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. 
at 1723). From this language, we conclude that a proponent of a 
peremptory challenge violates equal protection when that 
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proponent relies upon either race or gender when explaining the 
reasons underlying a peremptory challenge. 
Ul9 Here, contrary to the State's argument, the Prosecutor's 
explanation for the challenge to the potential juror was clearly 
gender-based. While the State suggests that the Prosecutor's 
intent was to seat "a jury composed of a fair cross-section of 
the community," not to remove jurors based on gender, the 
Constitution does not guarantee either the State or a defendant a 
jury comprised of any specific gender balance or composition.2 
See id. at 128, 114 S. Ct. at 1421; CJL. Tavlor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 538, 95 S. Ct. 692, 702 (1975) (articulating a similar 
principle as applied to the racial composition of a jury). 
Rather, the Constitution guarantees only that every defendant 
will be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to 
"nondiscriminatory criteria." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S. 
Ct. at 1717. in attempting to create gender balance in the jury, 
the Prosecutor, by necessity, was forced to dismiss at least one 
potential juror on the basis of gender. Thus, the Prosecutor's 
criteria was discriminatory and in violation of the potential 
juror's equal protection rights. 
120 Ordinarily, following our examination of the reasons 
proffered to explain a peremptory challenge, our focus would 
shift to examining the trial court's conclusions. See Colwell, 
2000 UT 8 at 120. However, because it is clear that the 
prosecutor failed to provide a facially neutral explanation for 
his peremptory strike of the potential juror, and instead 
provided a reason that violated equal protection guarantees, we 
conclude as a matter of law that the trial court clearly erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to strike the potential juror. Contrary 
to the trial court's belief, there are no circumstances under 
2. The State, in its brief, points to a number of cases from 
outside this jurisdiction to support its argument. However, 
after reviewing these cases, we conclude that they offer little 
or no assistance to the State's cause. Rather, as identified by 
the State, each of these cases deals with the so called "dual 
motivation" analysis, which has been adopted by a number of 
jurisdictions to avoid reversal when a party provides a clearly 
discriminatory rationale for exercising a peremptory challenge, 
but also provides at least one neutral explanation. See, e.g., 
United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1996); 
People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-58 (111. 2001). Because 
the Prosecutor in the instant case offered no neutral explanation 
to support his peremptory strike, we do not believe these cases 
offer any assistance to our analysis. Moreover, we have not 
adopted the "dual motivation" analysis and we conclude that this 
case does not present the proper case for its consideration. 
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which a party is permitted to publicly rely upon an impermissible 
classification to make decisions concerning the composition of a 
jury. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose outlined in 
both Batson and J.E.B.: to protect the integrity of the jury 
system and to ensure that potential jurors are not purposefully 
excluded through impermissible classifications, whether or not a 
party believes that it may factor into its eventual success or 
failure. £e£ Ex Parte State of Alabama, 659 So. 2d 169, 174 
(Ala. 1995) . 
CONCLUSION 
H22 We therefore reverse Chatwin's conviction and remand for a 
new trial. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Cudge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H 
PresJ 
Jackson, 
.Judge 
Jar Z. Davis 
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